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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAFT-HARTLEY AcT-PROHIBITION OF
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES BY LABOR UNIONS.
-The defendant, through its president, published an editorial in its
official publication, the C.I.O. News, endorsing a candidate for a na-
tional elective office. In the editorial, it was clearly stated that the
primary purpose of this endorsement was to violate a provision of
the Taft-Hartley Act, whereby labor unions were brought within the
prohibition, formerly applied only to corporations and federal banks,
against using corporate or union funds to further the candidacy of
any person seeking an elective post in the Federal Government.1 The
present action was brought before a federal district court, which dis-
missed the complaint on the grounds that the provision in question
was unconstitutional, 2 and the complainant appealed. Held, the com-
plaint should be dismissed. The alleged violation does not come
within the statute. The statute refers to instances where funds, paid
into the union treasury by its members for union activities, are used
to further the candidacy of a .person seeking office in the Federal
Government. If the endorsement appears in a union newspaper, sub-
scribed to voluntarily by the union members, and it was the latters'
intent that their subscriptions should be used for the purpose of this
publication, there has been no violation. Since it is a function of a
newspaper to state its opinion on political issues, the court did not
believe it was the intent of Congress to prohibit this constitutional
right. Since the indictment failed to allege the source of funds for
the publication in question, it was impossible for the court to say if
there had been a violation and thus the question of constitutionality
does not appear. Three justices concurred in the dismissal, but felt
that the Act should be declared unconstitutional. United States v.
Congress of Industrial Organizations, - U. S. -, 92 L. ed. 1315
(1948).
As early as 1882, the Supreme Court stated that the contribu-
tion of money as a means of political expression is subject to regu-
lation.3 The present statute is an amendment to the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act,4 and differs only in that it includes labor unions; and
in that the expression "contributions" has been lengthened to read,
"contributions and expenditures." The majority opinion in the in-
stant case felt that the change in the phraseology was made for the
purpose of clarification, while in a concurring opinion four justices
felt that the additional words are expansive, and, being expansive,
161 STAT. 159, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1509 (Supp. 1947).
2United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 77 F. Supp. 355(D. D. C. 1948).
3EX parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. 232 (1882).
443 STAT. 1074 (1925), 2 U. S. C. §251 (1946). The first serious step
toward regulation was taken in 1907, 34 STAT. 864 (1907) ; its immediate suc-
cessor, 35 STAT. 1103 (1909), was upheld as constitutional in United States
v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163 (W. D. Pa. 1916). The act
of 1925 is substantially thq same as that of 1909.
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cross the border of proper regulation into the field of free speech.
While the right of free speech is not absolute, any restriction of the
right must not be substantial, and must be aimed at the correction
of a definite evil which Congress believes to be imminent. 6 It is not
for the court to say whether Congress acted wisely, but merely
whether it has the power so to act.7 Where a statute is reasonably
susceptible of two interpretations, the court must adopt that construc-
tion which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity.8 In
determining the constitutionality of this statute when such issue is
squarely presented, the questions to be decided will be: (1) is the
new phraseology expansive, (2) does it substantially abridge freedom
of speech, and (3) is it reasonable?
J. F. W.
EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIzuRE NOT VALID
WHERE SEARCH WARRANT COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED.-In Jan-
uary, 1946, agents of the Alcoholic Tax Unit of the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue were informed by one Kell that petitioners were
seeking to lease a part of his farm with the intention of erecting a
building thereon and that he suspected their purpose was to build
and operate an illegal still. The federal agents instructed Kell to
accept the proposition and assigned one of their men to work on the
farm in the disguise of a farm hand. This agent kept the Government
currently informed as to every detail of petitioners' activities during
the month prior to the arrest. When federal agents approached the
premises, they observed, through an open door, petitioner Antoniole
apparently in the process of operating the still and immediately en-
tered and arrested him, The agents then proceeded to seize the
equipment and all other tangible evidence of the illegal distillery.
The agents had neither a search warrant nor warrants of arrest.
Petitioners were charged with various violations arising out of their
ownership and operation of the distillery, but before being indicted
made a motion to exclude and suppress the evidence secured by the
agents, alleging that it had been obtained by an illegal seizure. The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third District af-
firmed an order of the District Court of the United States for the
District of New Jersey denying this motion. Held, reversed on the
ground that since there was ample opportunity to obtain a search
warrant and no need for summary seizure, the search was not jus-
5 Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N. E. 2d
115 (1946).
6 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095 (1927).
" United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 91 L. ed.
754 (1947).
8 United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407, 408, 53 L. ed.
836, 848, 849 (1909).
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